After the Grind

Three Futures, One Question

· Andrew Perkins

Three essays landed on my desk this week, each one written as a dispatch from the future. Each one projecting forward from this exact moment in 2026 to imagine what the AI disruption actually does to the economy. They agree on the setup. They agree on the mechanism. They disagree, violently, on the ending.

And the gap between their conclusions is precisely the gap that should terrify anyone who works in higher education.

The Setup Everyone Agrees On

CitriniResearch published “The 2028 Global Intelligence Crisis,” a macro research memo written from the perspective of June 2028. Joe Burnett of Unchained Capital published a companion piece, “The 2028 Intelligence Policy Response,” set in the same universe. And Daniel Jeffries, a tech futurist, published “The Abundance Boom: A Memo from 2030,” looking back from two years further out.

All three start from the same observation: agentic AI tools take a step function jump in late 2025. By mid-2026, a competent developer with Claude Code or Codex can replicate the core functionality of a mid-market SaaS product in weeks. Procurement managers start using this as leverage. Contracts get renegotiated at 30% discounts. The long tail of SaaS gets crushed. Then the systems of record start feeling it too.

All three agree that AI-driven layoffs begin in early 2026 and accelerate through the year. Margins expand. Earnings beat. Stocks rally. The companies most threatened by AI become its most aggressive adopters, because the alternative is to sit still and die slower.

All three agree that cost structures collapse across creative and professional industries. Film production costs drop 70-85%. Software development costs fall by half or more. Marketing, legal, financial services: every category where the value proposition was “I will navigate complexity that you find tedious” gets disrupted, because the agents find nothing tedious.

That is where the agreement ends.

The Doom Scenario

CitriniResearch traces what happens when you follow the economic logic to its conclusion. White-collar workers drive roughly 65% of discretionary consumer spending in the United States. When those workers lose their jobs or take 50% pay cuts to move into available roles, they stop spending. Companies that sell things to consumers sell fewer of them. Weakened, they invest more in AI to protect margins. AI gets better. More workers get cut.

The memo calls this the “human intelligence displacement spiral,” and its most unsettling quality is that it has no natural brake. Every company’s individual response is rational. The collective result is catastrophic.

The piece coins a term I have not been able to stop thinking about: “Ghost GDP.” Output that shows up in the national accounts but never circulates through the real economy. A single GPU cluster in North Dakota generating the output previously attributed to 10,000 white-collar workers in midtown Manhattan. The economy grows on paper. The people inside it get poorer.

By June 2028 in this scenario, the S&P is down 38% from its highs. Unemployment is at 10.2%. The private credit market is defaulting. And the most devastating line in the entire essay: “We probably could have figured this out sooner if we just asked how much money machines spend on discretionary goods.”

The answer is zero.

The Investment Thesis

Burnett’s companion piece accepts this crisis as given and asks a different question: where does money flow?

His answer is elegant and cold. The deflationary shock from AI forces central banks to cut rates to zero. Massive QE follows. Fiscal expansion, extended unemployment benefits, pseudo-UBI. The system bends but does not break, because policymakers have the same playbook they used in 2008 and 2020.

But the recovery is uneven. Traditional assets go sideways. Equities face ongoing valuation challenges as business models adjust. Real estate stabilizes without real appreciation. Fixed income yields nothing.

The winner, in Burnett’s framing, is Bitcoin. Not because of any ideological argument, but because of monetary mechanics. Bitcoin does not depend on labor income. It does not rely on earnings multiples. It reflects monetary liquidity. In a world where central banks are printing to prevent deflation, the asset that most directly absorbs that expansion wins.

It is the most pragmatic of the three pieces. It does not argue about whether the disruption is good or bad. It just asks: given this scenario, what do you own?

The Optimist’s Rebuttal

Jeffries writes from 2030, and his message is simple: the doomers were wrong. Again. As always.

His centerpiece is a five-person team in Jakarta that drops a film competing with Marvel for box office dominance. Budget: $2.8 million. Opening weekend: $340 million. The director used to work at a call center.

Hollywood did not die. It made 4,000 films a year instead of 150. The $300 million tentpole got rarer. The $20 million film became ubiquitous. And most of those $20 million films were more interesting than the algorithmic superhero content of the early 2020s.

The same pattern repeated everywhere. When you drop the cost of making a video game by 85%, you do not get fewer games. You get 50,000 new studios. When you drop the cost of starting a business to near zero, you do not get fewer entrepreneurs. You get an explosion of micro-studios, one to five person teams creating products that would have required 50 to 500 people in 2026.

Nurses earn slightly more in nominal terms but their purchasing power is up 40% because everything got cheaper. The aspiring filmmaker can actually make films. The game developer can actually ship games.

Jeffries calls this “the lump of labor fallacy dressed up in neural network clothing.” The assumption that human wants are finite, that task automation equals job elimination, that we cannot adapt. He has 200 years of precedent on his side.

The Question Nobody Answers

Here is what struck me about reading these three pieces back to back: they all describe the same disruption. They all agree on the mechanism. They even agree, implicitly, on what kinds of human work survive and become more valuable.

The Jakarta filmmakers in Jeffries’ scenario succeed because they have vision, taste, and storytelling instincts. The marketing consultant who 4x’s her revenue does it because she can do strategic thinking and build client relationships. The content writer gets rehired because someone has to know good copy from garbage.

The CitriniResearch memo reaches the opposite conclusion not because it disagrees about human capability, but because it observes that the economic system does not automatically route displaced workers into their highest-value roles. The market does not care that you have good taste if no one is hiring for taste. The feedback loop grinds forward regardless of individual human potential.

Burnett does not address the question at all. He assumes the crisis happens, assumes the policy response happens, and positions his portfolio accordingly.

None of them answer the question that matters most: how do we actually prepare people for this transition?

This is the gap I keep coming back to in my own work. I teach marketing to undergraduates at Washington State University. These students are going to graduate into whichever version of this future actually arrives. Maybe it is the Citrini scenario, where the economy contracts and white-collar jobs evaporate. Maybe it is the Jeffries scenario, where costs collapse and opportunity explodes. Maybe it is something in between.

In every version, the same skills survive: interpretation, integration, interpersonal connection, and imagination. The ability to look at ambiguous data and decide what it means. The ability to synthesize across domains. The ability to build trust with another human being. The ability to envision something that does not yet exist.

I call this the 4I Framework, and it is the thesis of my book After the Grind. The grind, the repetitive, procedural, rules-based work that defined most professional careers, is being absorbed by machines. What remains is the work that requires judgment, creativity, and human connection.

But here is the uncomfortable part: knowing what skills matter and actually building those skills are two very different things. Jeffries assumes the transition happens naturally. The Jakarta team just figures it out. The marketing consultant just adapts. The content writer just levels up.

Maybe. For some people. But what about the rest?

What Business Schools Should Be Doing

The CitriniResearch memo ends with markets in freefall and policymakers scrambling. Jeffries’ memo ends with abundance and optimism. The truth will land somewhere between them, and the variable that determines where is preparation.

If we send students into this economy with nothing but task-execution skills, how to run a spreadsheet, how to write a report, how to follow a process, we are sending them into the Citrini scenario. Their skills will be automated. Their earning power will collapse. They will join the displacement spiral.

If we send students into this economy with the ability to interpret, integrate, connect, and imagine, we are sending them into the Jeffries scenario. They will be the five-person team in Jakarta. They will be the marketing consultant who 4x’s her revenue. They will be the people who use AI to eliminate the barrier between their vision and its execution.

The difference between dystopia and abundance is not technology. It is not policy. It is not investment strategy.

It is education.

And right now, most business schools are not even close to ready.

We are still teaching students to do the grind. We are still grading them on process compliance. We are still pretending that the ability to execute a routine task reliably is a marketable skill.

Three writers looked into the future and saw three different worlds. In all three of them, the people who could only execute were replaced. In all three of them, the people who could think, create, and connect survived.

The question is not which future arrives. The question is which future we prepare our students for.

Andrew Perkins is the author of After the Grind: Rethinking Your Business Career in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics and Chair of the Department of Marketing and International Business at Washington State University’s Carson College of Business.

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